
Imagine you’re a student living with some colleagues in a furnished apartment. You live together and share the rent but you are different. Each one of you has his own characteristics and his needs. For example, one of you studies all night, while another wakes up early and goes to bed early, and a third studies while listening to loud music. You must also share communal duties: Who cooks and who washes the dishes? How do you divide the electricity bill? You have to arrive at a system that reconciles your rights and your duties so that you all stick to it. Would it make sense for one of you to draw up a roster unilaterally and impose it on the others? Of course not. The only right way to set up the system is for everyone to sit down, agree on a system, and promise to put it into practice. This simple example illustrates the meaning and value of a national constitution. As individual members of society, just like the students renting the apartment, we have to sit down together to write the constitution ourselves. Dustour, the Arabic word for constitution, is a word of Persian origin meaning foundation. It’s a set of legal principles that define the nature of the state and regulate the various estates in terms of their composition, their jurisdiction, and their relationship with the other estates, as well as establishing the rights and duties of individuals.
Throughout the world, when a people want to write a constitution, they do exactly what the students who are living together do. Every sector or group in society elects representatives who form a constituent assembly that proposes articles for the constitution, which are discussed in public and then submitted to the people through a referendum. Egyptian society has many diverse sectors: professionals, workers, and farmers; Upper Egyptians, Nubians, and Copts. A constitution must reflect the interests of all these. If there were four or five Egyptians who were Hindus or Buddhists, the constitution would have to respect their rights and needs. This is the established and conventional concept of a constitution, and after the Egyptian revolution succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak, experts in constitutional law agreed that the old constitution had lapsed with the fall of Mubarak. They advocated electing a constituent assembly, but the military council rejected the will of the revolution and decided to implement constitutional amendments that Mubarak announced in his last moments, even though the revolution had rejected them. The military council formed a committee for constitutional amendments that strangely included only one professor of constitutional law, Dr. Atef el-Banna. With full respect for them, the other members were lawyers who did not have the slightest experience in constitutional law, and the committee members were of only two political persuasions. Half of them were protégés of the Mubarak regime and the other half were members or sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood. The amendments were made, the referendum took place, and it was clear the military council wanted the people to approve them.
The Muslim Brotherhood helped the military council in this: after demanding, like all the revolutionaries, a new constitution, they changed their minds, accepted the amendments, and put all their weight behind carrying out the will of the military council. The Brotherhood resorted to morally prohibited election tactics such as spreading rumours among simple people that rejecting the amendments and demanding a new constitution would eliminate Article 2, which stipulates that Islam is the state religion, even though this article was not part of the amendments in the first place. The result was that the constitution was approved, and—despite the irregularities by the religious forces in the referendum—everyone was under a moral and national obligation to respect the result. The surprise was that it was the military council that did not respect the result, in fact quite the contrary. While the referendum was on only nine specified articles in the 1971 constitution, the military council took everyone by surprise by promulgating an interim constitution of 63 articles, on which Egyptians had not been consulted. Did the military council ask us if he wanted to abolish or preserve the Shura Council, the upper house of Egypt’s Parliament? Did they ask us if we wanted to preserve the requirement that fifty percent of members of Parliament be either workers or peasants? Did they ask us if we wanted a presidential or parliamentary system? By promulgating the interim constitution, the military council practically and legally cancelled the referendum result and imposed a political system on the Egyptian people without referring to the people.
The military council’s coup against the referendum result was obvious to anyone with two eyes, but nonetheless the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists behind them ignored the way the military council had turned against the will of the people and decided to back the military council by any means and at any price in order to reach power. What’s amazing is that the Muslim Brothers are repeating with the military council the same mistakes they have committed with everyone who has ruled Egypt: King Farouk, Ismail Sedki (known as the butcher of the people), Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar Sadat. Every time, the Brotherhood takes part in the national movement and then at a certain moment breaks ranks to make a rapprochement with those in power, who always use them to undermine the national opposition. Then, once they have fulfilled their purpose with the Brotherhood, they throw them aside, or turn against them and crack down on them. So the cart has been put before the horse and all of Egypt has been pushed in the wrong direction. The Brotherhood has become what looks like the political wing of the military council, praising the council day and night and taking a strong stand against anyone who criticizes its decisions.