NATO's 'Dutch Disease'

Small wars and small coalition partners: This is really what should worry NATO. Small wars are difficult to win; small coalition partners are difficult to ignore. On Saturday, as coalition forces were fighting their way in a make-it-or-break-it offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Marja, the Dutch government was carrying on a make-it-or-break-it fight of its own. In terms of the latter, however, they opted to break it—the government collapsed after a final effort to keep Dutch troops in Afghanistan failed miserably. Bad timing, to say the least. But the “fall of The Hague” could be worse. Disregarding the appeals of NATO’s secretary general, the leadership of the Labor Party, the smaller partner in the governing coalition in the Netherlands, made it clear that Dutch troops should return home by the end of the year. The new reality in Europe is that a call from NATO headquarters in Brussels is not enough to change a country’s politics.

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The collapse of the coalition government in the Netherlands was hardly a surprise. It was no secret that the Christian Democrats and the Labor Party were in the mood for a divorce, evidenced by a 76 percent public disapproval rating. What really matters is not the Labor Party's decision to torpedo the coalition, but its decision to do it over the government’s Afghanistan policy.

There are several simple conclusions to be made. Unlike the days of the Cold War, foreign and security policy in Western Europe is not outside the sidelines from domestic political games. In the days of the Cold War, the foreign policy was too important and politicians preferred to keep it out of normal politicking. In the post-Cold War period with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, foreign policy became important enough for electoral purposes. The perverse effect of the economic crisis is that the disputes over foreign policy is becoming highly attractive for political parties that have lost their ideologies and are in search of voters. Parties try to improve their chances of election by addressing symbolic issues—like war—and not by taking positions on major economic issues. If this trend continues, we can expect that foreign policy will be at the center of populist posturing, and NATO’s appeal for unity and responsibility will have no effect.

In short, in the age of populism, NATO will find it more and more difficult to sustain political support for out-of-area missions. And this challenge to NATO's new role should be seriously thought through in the new strategic concept of the alliance.