Turkey's Day of Reckoning

There is one thing that is uplifting about the debate on Iran. Military action is no longer seen as a viable, let alone desirable option, by straight-thinking people, Sarah Palin notwithstanding.

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Even the unfolding debate on containment and whether this would work puts less emphasis on the threat of force than on the country’s political isolation in the region, and the regime’s new elites within Iran. For such a shift in approach to be consequential, two things are necessary: Delicate diplomatic coalition building, and persistence. Coalition building must start in the region. Many observers seek a tacit alliance between Israel and some Arab states on this issue—alliances that had actually been in place since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. This is a fine idea, but even monarchies need some degree of legitimacy when they pursue a particular foreign policy.

A common front against Iran would necessitate some glimmer of hope that life in Gaza would improve and that some kind of process, which can respectably be called a peace process, is in the offing. It is true that Iran’s current policies and behavior about its nuclear program should not be mixed with Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. But this does not mean that it isn’t in the minds of the region’s populations.

Recently, the Turkish government and particularly Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan have been pretty vocal about these connections. As such, this adds to the popularity of Mr. Erdogan in the region even if his official interlocutors in Gulf countries feel a bit uncomfortable with his discourse. On the other hand, when one looks at the Turkish diplomacy with Iran, it is necessary to go beyond this populist rhetoric that irritates many.

Over the past several years, Turkish diplomacy has been instrumental in a quiet way in either blocking the expansion of, or reducing, Iranian influence in the Middle East. The role that the Turkish government played in persuading the Iraqi Sunnis to participate in the elections of 2005, as well as the joint efforts with Qatar to overcome the 2007-08 presidential crisis in Lebanon, were significant signposts. Most importantly though, Turkish diplomacy invested heavily in Syria at a time when the Iranian regime was most vulnerable after the assassination of Lebanon’s Rafik Hariri. Ankara did so against the wishes of Washington. That policy has already yielded the proximate talks between Israel and Syria that broke down after Gaza.

The United States came around to seeing Syria as part of the solution and not part of the problem. Most importantly, Turkey, by engaging Syria, did what Washington and conservative Arab countries wanted all along: That is, to put some distance between Damascus and Tehran.

In some sense then, it is curious that Ankara is so adamantly in favor of engaging Iran and opposes a sanctions regime under almost any circumstances. Turkey is not commonly mentioned in the debates about the Iranian nuclear program. Yet it is actively trying to find a middle ground between Iran and particularly the United States. The policy is risky in the sense that Tehran uses (or abuses) Turkey’s efforts and position to gain time and postpone the moment of reckoning. Yet there is much trust that has been built between the two capitals over the past few years.

In a recent interview with Der Spiegel, the former head of IAEA, Hans Blix suggested that Turkey be the location for the exchange of low-enriched for highly enriched uranium if a deal could be struck on this issue. “(T)here is an evident choice for that: Turkey” he said. “Both sides trust Turkey.”

It is difficult to keep a tab on the number of times Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with his Iranian counterpart Muttaki or American National Security Advisor James Jones. Just over two weeks ago at the Munich Security Conference, he met them both twice. He also contacts his American counterpart, Hillary Clinton, whenever it is necessary.

Davutoglu has been feverishly busy in order to find a formula to bring P5+1 and Iran to make a deal. Despite these efforts—and the acknowledgement by the American Ambassador in Turkey that Turkish officials have nudged Tehran—not many people are aware of Ankara’s role in this process either. Turkey is therefore at least a supporting actor in the unfolding drama of the Iranian nuclear program. Ankara does not desire to see a nuclearized Iran any more than the other countries in the region; however, it staunchly opposes sanctions that will damage its own economy, and it certainly rejects a war option.

The day of reckoning may come though if there is a vote in the Security Council on a sanctions regime against Iran. The United States and the Western allies will expect Turkey to be on their side. As a NATO ally, Turkey should vote yes to sanctions even if very reluctantly. Yet, if such a vote is ever seriously considered, Ankara may also decide to abstain, arguing that this is necessary in order to keep the lines of communication open with Tehran. After all, it did so a couple of months ago at the IAEA meeting that reprimanded Iran for the same reason.

So it also serves Turkey’s interests that some semblance of negotiations continues for as long as possible in order to avoid the choice—and the day of reckoning.