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Revitalizing Taiwan's Economy

TAIPEI, Taiwan — This country’s economy is in deep trouble. It’s stagnant; GDP growth has been in the low single digits or worse for more than a year, and average wages for Taiwanese workers have been frozen for a decade or longer.

So I asked President Ma Ying-jeou what he was going to do about it. He cited several problems but then concluded: “We need to revitalize our economy by moving from manufacturing efficiency to innovation and added value.”

Innovation. That may prove to be the greatest challenge in Taiwan’s six-decade history.

“There has been no new industry here in Taiwan, not really, in 30 years,” C. Y. Cyrus Chu, minister of the National Science Council told me. “We just follow and pick up what the Japanese don’t want to do.”

Since the industrial revolution, Asia has not shown itself to be a font of innovation. Even when Japan was at its manufacturing zenith in the 1970s and 1980s, it generally took other people’s inventions and turned them into more marketable products. Perhaps the best example is the Sony Walkman.

The High Cost of a Weak President

Anyone with a television set has seen the footage: fathers weeping over the tiny asphyxiated corpses of their children, women weeping over men; bodies wracked with convulsions, labored breathing—all the likely results of nerve gas, chemical weapons. In other words, these dead are the handiwork of Bashar al-Assad.

The rest of the world cannot be surprised. This sort of mass murder is nothing new for the Assad family: In 1982, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, ordered the development of a chemical weapons arsenal. To make his artillery extra potent, Syrian scientists incorporated into the mix the nerve agent sarin, which is 500 times more toxic than cyanide, and was—of course—originally developed in Nazi Germany during the 1930s.

Syria's War Spreads to Lebanon

It finally happened. Syria’s civil war has officially spilled into Lebanon, and the two sides are using mass casualty terrorism against one another.

Earlier this month, a car bomb exploded in Hezbollah’s stronghold in the suburbs south of Beirut, killing dozens And this week, at least 47 people were killed and more than 500 wounded when two car bombs exploded next to mosques in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, Lebanon’s second-largest.

This wasn’t inevitable, exactly, but it wasn’t hard to foresee.

If you divide the hostile factions into two blocs, it’s obvious who is responsible for each of these terrorist attacks.

Somebody associated with the Free Syrian Army—and by extension the Middle East’s Sunnis—detonated the car bomb in Hezbollahland, a Shia area that is generally on side with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and the Iranian government.

Meanwhile, somebody associated with the so-called “Resistance Bloc,” the Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah axis, attacked the two mosques in Tripoli and killed all those people.

But Lebanon is the kind of place where a variety of different groups could theoretically be responsible for any one given car bomb.

The Free Syrian Army has been threatening for months to come after Hezbollah in Lebanon unless it withdraws its forces from Syria. The same goes for the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra. Lebanon itself has no shortage of radical Sunnis—including a small number of Salafists—who wouldn’t flinch at terrorizing the terrorists in their own nest.

The Tripoli bombs could have been set by Hezbollah. Or maybe Syrian intelligence agents. Possibly the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. They’re all terrorists and they’re all on the same side.

Supposedly a man named Sheik Ahmad al-Ghareeb has been arrested for the Tripoli bombs. He’s a Sunni with alleged ties to Hezbollah, and word has it he was caught on surveillance cameras. That would make him ideal. Hezbollah and the Syrians could then say to the Sunnis, one of your own people did this to you, so don’t go blaming or retaliating against us.

But the number of Lebanese Sunnis who sympathize with Hezbollah and the Assad family is vanishingly small. It’s not zero, but it’s close. Finding someone from the Sunni community who is willing to blow up two of his “own” mosques would be monumentally difficult. So we shouldn’t swallow this story yet. In Lebanon, though, anything’s possible. 

If al-Ghareeb is guilty, however, and he is who they say he is, his crime still leads back to Hezbollah which remains, as always, at the end of the day, a terrorist organization.

For forty years now, terrorism has been Syria’s only real export. It’s still exporting terrorism even while engulfed in a war. And it’s suffering more terrorism now than anyone else. Hezbollah pioneered the use of the car bomb in the Middle East*. Now it knows what it feels like to be on the receiving end of its weapon of choice. So there’s some twisted karmic justice here of a sort.

But the longer the war in Syria goes on (and it could go on for years even after the Assad regime goes down the garbage disposal), the more likely this war will become a full-blown regional conflagration that could suck in more nations than it already has.

*Correction: The Stern Gang actually deployed the first car bomb in the Middle East.

Remembering Seven Dissidents and Soviet Brutality

August 25, 1968, was one of the most important days in the history of the Soviet dissident movement. That Sunday, seven people came out into Moscow’s Red Square in an open demonstration of protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soviet tanks had rolled into that country on August 21st in an effort to suppress the “Prague Spring”—a dangerous precedent of political liberalization in the Communist bloc. Soviet newspapers demonstrated “nationwide support” for the invasion, while “workers’ collectives” across the country passed on-cue resolutions in favor of Operation Danube.

At noon on August 25th, seven people—Larisa Bogoraz, Konstantin Babitsky, Vadim Delaunay, Vladimir Dremlyuga, Pavel Litvinov, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, and Viktor Fainberg—sat down by the Place of Skulls on Red Square, across from the Kremlin’s Spasskaya gate. The demonstration was silent; the protesters raised a small Czechoslovak flag and makeshift posters reading “Long live free and independent Czechoslovakia!,” “Down with the occupiers!,” and, perhaps most famously, “For your freedom and ours!”

Time for the Big Stick in Syria

There are times when President Obama seems intent on reversing the terms of Theodore Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly, and carry a big stick” when it comes to foreign policy.  By combining tough talk about “red lines” with inaction on Syria, he is eroding the deterrent power of the United States. And that is no small thing in this new world disorder of ours.

This week the president called a chemical weapons attack that took place outside of Damascus … “troublesome.” For the leader of the free world, the man who owns the biggest bully pulpit in the world, the commander of the armed forces of what remains the indispensable nation, to call a terrible atrocity of this kind “troublesome” is so weak as to be a virtual provocation to President Assad to escalate. Indeed it is possible that Assad ordered this attack—and the accumulating experience in Syria tells us that actions of this kind are indeed sanctioned from above—precisely because he knew he would not pay any price.

China’s Incredible Shrinking Economy

How big is the Chinese economy? Beijing’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that the country’s gross domestic product totaled $8.28 trillion last year.

Perhaps. Christopher Balding, an associate professor at the HSBC Business School at Peking University, thinks it’s more than a trillion dollars smaller. GDP numbers are supposed to show changes in a country’s output without regard to inflation or deflation. In an August 14th paper, Balding persuasively argues that the NBS grossly understates and underweights housing costs in adjusting nominal GDP for inflation to arrive at real GDP.

Reader Feedback Needed

The Middle East has never been the only part of the world I want to visit and write about, and I’d like to branch out again.

My first attempt to expand my beat, so to speak, was a smashing success. Of the four books I’ve written so far, Where the West Ends—which mostly takes place in the post-communist region of Eastern Europe and Western Asia—is my best-seller. Amazon.com still ranks it in the top 100 in the Eastern Europe category a year after it was first published, and it was in the top slot just a few months ago.

This time I’d like to broaden my scope not to the post-communist world but the part of the world that's still actually communist.

Five communist countries remain: Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and China. China and Vietnam are post-Marxist, of course, but they’re still ruled by the Communist Party. Laos remains an old school hard-line communist police state even after all these long years.


Monument to Kaysone Phomvihane, leader of the Lao People’s Liberation Army

Cuba, as we all know too well, is still under the boot of the largely unreconstructed Castro family.


Havana, Cuba

North Korea still has the most horrendous political system of all—a Stalinist monarchy ruled by a quasi-theocratic God-king.

I suspect these vestigial regimes aren’t long for this world, but who knows? China and Vietnam have already transitioned half-way to something else, but the other three are living museum pieces, frozen in the brutal mid-20th century when totalitarianism held sway over whole swaths of the planet. They’ve lasted so long now they look almost permanent.


China’s Ministry of Defense


Shanghai, China


Shijiazhuang, China

North Korea will prove a tough place to get into, but the others should not be. The United States bans travel to Cuba, but journalists are exempt, so that won’t be a problem at all. Reporting from inside police states can be tricky, but I’ve done it before and am familiar with the various workarounds.

If I can make my way to at least four of these countries, I’ll have more than enough material for another book, a sort of sequel to Where the West Ends and The Road to Fatima Gate.

What do you think? Does that sound interesting and worthwhile? Would you be willing to fund Kickstarter projects for each of these places? It’s interesting to me, and I always write better when I’m interested in the topic, but I also need to make sure it’s interesting to you.


Political poster in Vietnam


Hanoi, Vietnam

I don’t want to stop writing about the Middle East. What I want to do is get out of my rut and add more places to write about. I’ve never been to any of these countries before. I’ve never been to any country that’s still actually communist. New experiences will invigorate my writing and photography as a matter of course.

The foreign journalism industry has all but collapsed, so I’ll need some Kickstarter cash, but if you’re interested and want this to work, it will work.

Let me know what you think in the comments.

Media Distortion and the Brotherhood's 'Peaceful' Activists

“Dear Friends,” the letter I receive from an Egyptian intellectual begins, “For the last six weeks since the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, the Western media consistently portrayed the sit-ins that paralyzed Cairo and other parts of Egypt as sit-ins by ‘peaceful demonstrators.’ As mayhem broke out throughout Egypt today, they conveniently ignored what was happening in the rest of the country to focus on those ‘peaceful demonstrators.’”

Peaceful demonstrators? marvels this Egyptian correspondent. “Peaceful demonstrators do not have the capacity to kill police personnel, documented by name, rank, and serial number in a few hours. Peaceful demonstrators do not attack the Kerdasa (a neighborhood close to the pyramids) police station with rocket-propelled grenades, kill the station’s police officers, strip them of their clothes, and drag their bodies down the street. Peaceful demonstrators do not threaten Christians with genocide as was called for by many of their leaders over the last six weeks, and as documented by multiple videos available on YouTube and other outlets.”

Egypt Spins its Wheels

Walter Russell Mead’s latest essay in The American Interest, Bambi Meets Godzilla in the Middle East, is a must-read. I wish he was wrong, but alas he is not.

Bambi, in his formulation, is President Barack Obama, of course. Godzilla describes both radical Islamists and the Egyptian military regime.

I believe that democratic capitalism works better than the alternatives (though it does not work perfectly) and that other things being equal over time the societies who embrace these ideas will outperform those who do not.

But this does not mean that I believe that the world will become liberal and democratic tomorrow or that the path to this future will be a smooth and steady ascent. As a Christian, I believe in the Second Coming and the Last Judgment; that does not mean I have maxed out my credit cards in the belief that Jesus is returning tomorrow.

Unfortunately, much of our political and policy class, both on the left and the right, shares an unfounded confidence that liberal capitalism is going to triumph tomorrow. They are the secular, liberal counterparts of Christian fundamentalists waiting for the Rapture, a near-magical translation to a better world. This is what most American policy makers believed about Russia in the heady years after the Soviet collapse. President George W. Bush bet the ranch on the imminent democratization of the Middle East. So did President Obama.

This is not a new mistake. Thomas Jefferson was sure that the French Revolution heralded the dawn of democracy in 18th century Europe. Henry Clay thought the Latin American revolutions against Spain would create stable democracies across South America. Many Americans thought the 1848 revolutions in Europe would establish true freedom in the Old World. Many Americans thought that Sun Yat Sen’s revolution in China would establish democracy there back in 1911. Alexander Kerensky’s Russia was hailed as an ‘emerging democracy’ in 1917. Woodrow Wilson thought he could kill history with Fourteen Points and a League. It was a thought crime among liberal and progressive people to doubt that Africa would race ahead to democratic capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s as colonialism ended.

We are not always wrong. Germany, Japan and, in its own eccentric way, Italy all became liberal capitalist states after World War Two. Most of the Warsaw Pact countries signed up to the program in the 1990s. Much of East Asia has been moving in a liberal direction as its prosperity has grown. Mexico, Chile and Brazil, among other Latin states, are looking more like Henry Clay once hoped they would.

As a nation, we are not very good at figuring out when the end of history is going to dawn in particular countries, and because we are looking so hard for the triumph of democratic capitalism, we tend to assume that any sound we hear in the night must be its footsteps drawing nigh.

The Middle East is not monolithic. Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, and—yes—even Iran have many of the necessary ingredients for a successful transition to a properly functioning democracy. They also still have some obstacles, especially in Iran. Turkey has had a semi-dysfunctional quasi-democracy for decades while Saudi Arabia is no more ready to even begin taking the plunge than North Korea is now.

Egypt isn’t ready yet either. By now that should be clear. The United States should prod Egyptians in that direction anyway so they’ll understand what is ultimately expected of them, but be realistic about it and don’t expect it to work any time soon.

The Middle East Time Machine

Moving forward on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn’t easy, but Yovav Kalifon is actually making progress by going back in time. That’s right. His Tiyul-Rihla, or Project Trip, takes groups of Israelis and Palestinians on educational trips in their respective homelands, revisiting the past in order to challenge to what Kalifon sees as the chief obstacle to peace—history. 

These journeys allow Israelis and Palestinians to examine history quite literally in context. Participants explore the land together, building by building, town by town, many of them revisiting their own culture identity along the way. Donations help keep participation costs low: Hosts pay the equivalent of $15 to $20, guests about $70 to $80 per trip.

“As a scientist, I know how easily people fool themselves into thinking they know their stuff,” Kalifon, a physicist by training, told me by e-mail recently. “Once they know that they don’t know, they become more rational, inquisitive, and more likely to find the clues they missed earlier.”

Corruption and Crumbling Roads in Ukraine

Leave the city and drive along Ukraine’s rural roads and you’ll come away with a heightened appreciation of the everyday heroism of the country’s drivers. Although the vast majority of Ukraine’s roads—with the notable exception of the nicely paved thoroughfares leading up to Regionnaire palaces—are a complete mess, the people who have to negotiate these roller-coasters on a daily basis actually manage to survive their experiences and retain their good humor.

So there you are, just outside some city, and you’re coasting along at some 50 mph until, all at once, everybody, both you and the oncoming traffic, comes to a snail’s pace. For there, spread out before you like a World War I moonscape, are holes and craters of various sizes and depths. As a friend of mine said as we were driving south of Lviv: “This isn’t a road. It’s a direction.”

The Truth About Egypt

Egypt looks dodgier than ever right now.

Just six weeks after overthrowing the government in a military coup, the armed forces opened fire on civilians protesting the removal of President Mohammad Morsi and killed more than 500 people, prompting President Barack Obama to cancel joint American-Egyptian military drills.

Springtime never came to Cairo at all. In some ways, Egypt is right back where it was when Hosni Mubarak still ruled the country. The political scene is exactly the same. Two illiberal titans—a military regime and an Islamist opposition—are battling it out. But in other ways, Egypt is in worse shape now than it was. It’s more chaotic, more violent. Its economy is imploding, its people increasingly desperate.

I recently interviewed Eric Trager, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He’s a real expert on Egypt and has been more consistently right than just about anyone. He called out the Muslim Brotherhood as an inherently authoritarian organization while scores of other supposed “experts” falsely pimped it as moderate. And contrary to claims from the opposing camp, that the army “restored” democracy with its coup, he saw the recent bloody unpleasantness coming well in advance.

I spoke to him before this week’s massacre happened, but it’s clear from his remarks that he suspected something like it was coming.

MJT: For starters, what do you say to those who insist the Muslim Brotherhood is a moderate and democratic political party?

Eric Trager: The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly not democratic. Its view of Egyptian politics in one in which it should control everything. For example, while it is willing to pursue power through elections, once it comes to office its goal is to establish and Islamic state in which it and its institutions control the Egyptian bureaucracy and institute its version of Islam while sidelining and oppressing all opponents.

“Moderate” is an even less accurate word in describing the Brotherhood. It’s designed to weed out moderates during the recruitment process. The process of becoming a Muslim Brother is a five to eight year ordeal where potential Muslim Brothers are vetted through five tiers of membership that tests their commitment to the cause and their willingness to take orders. Anyone who has second thoughts about the organization, the ideology, or their willingness to blindly do what they’re told, is out.

When the Brotherhood first emerged as the leading organization after the 2011 uprising, a lot of observers thought it would become more moderate when forced to actually govern, but what those analysts overlooked that is that the Brotherhood prevents moderates from becoming members and prevents members from becoming moderates.

MJT: How did you learn about their internal structure? What are your sources?

Eric Trager: I’ve interviewed dozens of their leaders and rank-and-file members. I’ve interviewed many of the top figures that you read about in the press, including Mohammad Morsi.

MJT: So your sources are inside the organization rather than outside.

Eric Trager: Yes. I’m one of the few people who talked about this during the aftermath of the uprising, but I didn’t discover it. Richard Mitchell wrote about it in his book, The Society of the Muslim Brothers. It was originally published in 1968 and it’s considered the classic text on the Brotherhood, but many people who put themselves out there as experts on this subject haven’t read one of the most basic studies of the organization’s history. I’ve talked about this at conferences and been told by supposed experts that the Brotherhood isn’t structured that way. They obviously haven’t read Mitchell even though they have to if they’re going to call themselves experts.

MJT: But surely the organization has changed at least somewhat since 1968. That was a long time ago, before I was even born.

Eric Trager: Yes, of course. Mitchell lays out the early history of the organization, describes its recruitment process, and spells out the nationwide chain of command. He does these things well. The recruitment process and chain of command have been updated in some important respects. The recruitment process, for instance, has a few more membership levels now than it used to. But the basic idea that this is a vanguard and a closed society that ensures its members are totally committed to the cause and are willing to die for it is still true.

He also wrote that the Muslim Brotherhood was fading, and that didn’t pan out. But he was writing in 1968 during the time of the Nasser regime when the Brotherhood was severely repressed. He didn’t foresee its re-emergence under Sadat in the 1970s and then again under Mubarak. That much is understandable.

Many people think of the Brotherhood as an Islamist organization that rejects Al Qaeda style violence, so therefore it’s “moderate.” And this, in fact, is how Muslim Brotherhood leaders describe themselves when I talk to them. I’ll ask them what they mean when they say they’re moderates, and they’ll say, “we aren’t Al Qaeda.” Frankly, that has never been my standard of moderation. [Laughs.]

I think Washington’s fascination with the Brotherhood is the product of a search for an Islamist organization that reflects the “culture” of the Middle East and isn’t violent. There is a lack of appreciation for the fact that just because an organization doesn’t lead with violence doesn’t mean it’s going to be moderate or democratic or capable of governing.

And too many analysts took the Brotherhood’s claim of moderation at face value. The Brotherhood says it views shura, an Islamic concept that means consultation, as democracy. Many analysts said the Brotherhood is not only adopting democracy, it’s finding an Islamic justification for it. My view is that far from finding an Islamic justification for democracy, they were simply redefining democracy in a way that wasn’t democratic but sounded good to the West.

MJT: What do you make of all the Brotherhood’s talk lately about martyrdom? Is that a threat? Are they saying they’re willing to be killed by the government? Or is it just talk?

Eric Trager: The Brotherhood seems to believe that if it can draw the military into a fight directly, it can create fissures within the military—not necessarily because there are many Islamists in the military, although that’s possible, but because the Brotherhood believes Egyptian soldiers won’t fire on fellow Egyptians.

Remember that during the initial uprising, the soldiers didn’t fire on demonstrators in Tahrir Square. I think, although I can’t be certain, that many soldiers would have refused to follow that order. We can see this belief that the military would fracture if such orders were given reflected in the Brotherhood’s statements. For its part, the army insists it’s one army, that there aren’t any fissures. So I think that’s the Brotherhood’s angle right now.

One other thing: the Brotherhood has a five-part motto. The last two components of that motto are “Jihad is our way” and “Death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.”

It’s an open question how seriously they take that, but I often ask young Muslim Brotherhood members if they’d be willing to die as a martyr in Palestine, and some of them say yes.

I interviewed a young Brotherhood member in 2008 and he said he had recently snuck over the border into Gaza, and he said he hoped he’d be killed by an Israeli missile. It was incredibly disturbing to hear. He was a fairly intelligent twenty year-old. So now I always ask young members if they’d be willing to die as martyrs in Gaza, and many say they would like that.

So at least some of them take that motto seriously. We’ve also seen children of the Muslim Brothers dressed in shrouds at demonstrations, which suggests they’re ready to die. A critical mass of Muslim Brothers have prepared themselves for this possibility.

MJT: Why do you think General Sisi removed Morsi? Some Egyptian activists are calling it a “correction,” that the democratic revolution went off course, so the army stepped in and hit the reset button. I don’t buy it, personally. Sisi looks like he might even be somewhat of an Islamist himself. Either way, the man doesn’t strike me as any kind of democrat.

Eric Trager: I don’t buy it either, but I should say that during my conversations with officials in the Egyptian military leading up to Morsi’s removal, they didn’t seem at all eager to re-enter politics. The generals admitted they aren’t good at governing. They had a bad experience running the country after Mubarak. They aren’t trained to do police work, they’re trained to fight wars and defend borders.

But two things happened. First, we had a massive outpouring against Morsi due to his frankly undemocratic rule of the country and his bid to consolidate power for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Second, Morsi completely lost control of the state. By the time the protests started on June 30, he didn’t control anything. He didn’t control the police and he obviously didn’t control the military. He didn’t control any of the institutions of government, and it made his presidency untenable. So the military stepped in, somewhat reluctantly, first to respond to the protests and also to prevent impending state failure.

But once the army made the decision to step in, as reluctant as it may have been, it’s modus operandi unquestionably changed. It entered into a direct conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood, perhaps even an existential one. The military believes it not only has to remove Morsi, it has to decapitate the entire organization. Otherwise, the Brotherhood will re-emerge and perhaps kill the generals who removed it from power.

That’s what’s in Egypt’s future right now—persistent civil strife between the military and its supporters on one side and the Brotherhood and its supporters on the other.

MJT: When you say civil strife, I assume you don’t mean an Algerian-style conflict.

Eric Trager: Right. I mean something that’s probably—and hopefully—less deadly and less all-consuming. But it’s likely to become a constant feature of Egyptian life and politics. There’s likely to be a steady flow of violence, but it probably won’t be ubiquitous. It will consist in pockets around demonstration sites. It will be bad enough to disrupt life, and it will likely undermine a transition moving forward, but it probably won’t be as ugly as in Syria or Algeria.

MJT: Do you think getting rid of Morsi was a good thing, a bad thing, or is it too soon to tell?

Eric Trager: I don’t think it’s a good thing or a bad thing. It’s not really for me to say, and anyway I think it was inevitable. Once a president loses control of the state—whether he’s removed by a mass uprising, a military coup, or some other scenario—his presidency become untenable.

When I was standing in Tahrir Square after Morsi was removed, a felt a certain amount of sadness because I knew that violence would be an inevitable and significant consequence. People in the square were very happy, but people in another square a few miles away people were mourning. They believe something has been stolen from them, and they intend to fight to get it back.

I think the Brotherhood won’t get it back. It’s highly unlikely that Morsi will see the light of day outside a courtroom. But it’s a fight that’s going to continue for a while, and it’s a fight that many of those celebrating in the square that evening didn’t think about. Egyptian society is so polarized right now that the anti-Morsi camp and the pro-Morsi camp are beyond talking past each other. They exist in their own separate universes.

MJT: How much support do you think the Muslim Brotherhood actually lost since it won the election?

Eric Trager: It has lost substantial public support. Think back to the early presidential elections in 2012. Morsi only won five million votes, which was 25 percent of the votes cast. That’s not a high number. It’s substantially lower than what the Brotherhood had won just a few months earlier in the parliamentary elections. So already by May 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s support shrunk back to its base which is only around five million people.

The Brotherhood’s power is not derived from mass public support and it never has been. It is derived from its exceptional organization capabilities on one hand, and the fact that the rest of Egypt is deeply divided and highly disorganized on the other. That’s still the case. I think if Egypt had free and fair elections today, the Brotherhood would still do well and might even win because nobody else is prepared to run in an election.

Of course, I don’t expect there will be free and fair elections ahead, and the nature of the Brotherhood is about to change because the military is decapitating it. It’s hard to see right now exactly who will emerge, but whoever emerges given the current trajectory will need significant military support.

MJT: Why don’t you expect a free election?

Eric Trager: As reluctant as the military may have been to remove Morsi, now that it’s back in the picture, it won’t repeat the quote unquote “mistakes” it made last time. Certainly it’s going to view one of those mistakes as working with the Brotherhood to have parliamentary elections that the Brotherhood could win. I assume it will not allow the Brotherhood to re-emerge. The military will do something to the elections or to the Brotherhood that will take “free and fair” out of the equation.

MJT: Okay, so let’s say the White House were to ask you for advice about how to proceed if what you just said turns out to be true. What would you tell them?

Eric Trager: I’ve been telling the White House that they need to remember what they in Alcoholics Anonymous call the Serenity Prayer. “God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; courage to change the things I can; and wisdom to know the difference.”

I’ve never been to Alcoholics Anonymous and I’m not an alcoholic, but it’s relevant to what’s happening in Egypt right now. We need to understand what the consequences of removing Morsi are for the military. For example, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told Sisi he needed to release Morsi, but this is something that’s never going to happen. A general is not going to release a president he just toppled.

MJT: Right.

Eric Trager: This is something we can’t change, and if we try to change it, we’re going to fail, and we’re going to look like failures. Better to focus on the things we can change.

One thing we might be able to do is convince the military to deal with the Brotherhood and its supporters less violently. The military needs to find other mechanisms for containing these protests. That’s the first thing.

The second thing is to try to get a civilian-led transition process going that is open to participation by the Brotherhood, but isn’t dependent on participation by the Brotherhood. Instead of focusing on inclusion during the transition, we should focus on its effectiveness giving the Brotherhood—or what’s left of it—the choice to participate or not participate.

When the military removed Morsi, it promised exactly that kind of process and we should hold them accountable to what they’ve promised at the very least.

MJT: I assume that when you go over there you hear the same sorts of things from secular Egyptians that I do. Secular people in Egypt tell me they think the Obama administration is allied with the Muslim Brotherhood. Secular people in Tunisia say the same thing, and liberals in Lebanon think we’re siding with Bashar al-Assad in Syria. I hear this every single day without exception when I’m in the region.

Eric Trager: Of course, so do I.

MJT: What do you make of all that? Is it a result of unforced errors on the part of the United States government, or is it just typical Middle Eastern insanity?

Eric Trager: The United States has done a very poor job managing perceptions in Egypt. The administration assumed if it wasn’t critical about Morsi’s behavior domestically, they’d win his cooperation on foreign policy. The problem is that Morsi was only willing to cooperate with us on foreign policy in the short run. The Muslim Brotherhood wants to consolidate power in Egypt and then create a global Islamic state. It’s a key part of their ideology and their rhetoric. They talk about it with me. They can’t be our partners.

Worse, by not speaking up and criticizing Morsi as he tried to create unchecked power for himself, it created the impression that the United States wanted to replace Mubarak with the Muslim Brotherhood. That’s extremely damaging in a place like Egypt with such tumultuous politics.

We didn’t support the Brotherhood. We failed to speak up and manage perceptions. In the future, the only way to address this problem will be to make sure we don’t put all our eggs in one basket. We have to spread our risk by making sure we engage everybody.

MJT: Okay, now let me ask you this. Why should everyday Americans care about what happens in Egypt?

Eric Trager: For the simple reason that Egypt is a lynchpin of American foreign policy in the Middle East. It’s important for counter-terrorism, for maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, ensuring overflight rights so our planes can deliver goods to the Persian Gulf, to check Iran’s interests, and ensure passage through the Suez Canal.

But what I’ve found is that Americans not only understand Egypt’s importance strategically, they’re fascinated by Egypt. We study Egypt in the sixth grade. We learn about ancient Egyptian history even as children. It’s mentioned in the Bible. It’s one of the few countries in the world that actually resonates with ordinary Americans.

I think that’s why the American news media focused mostly on Egypt during the Arab Spring. Democratic uprisings in other countries wouldn’t attract the same kind of attention.

MJT: That’s certainly true. Tunisia was and still is mostly ignored, and it’s practically right next door.

Eric Trager: And farther afield we have countries like Burma. Most people don’t pay attention to these places. But Egypt resonates in America the way few other countries do.

I went on Egyptian television recently because people were angry about something I wrote on Twitter. So I went on to clear the air, and one of the things I said was that Americans are rooting for Egypt and that Egyptians should know that even when we have disagreements, Americans like Egypt. That’s not just rhetoric, that’s a fact.

Here’s something interesting: In 2010, Israel’s popularity in the United States was at 63 percent according to a Gallup poll. That same year, Egypt’s popularity was at 58 percent.

We know why Americans like Israel. We can trace it to the Bible, the fact that Israel is a Jewish country, it’s democratic, it’s developed, and all these other things. But Egypt is not democratic. It is not well-developed.

MJT: Yes, that is interesting.

Eric Trager: When Americans think about Egypt, they think about the pharaohs, the pyramids, and the Bible. They know about the peace treaty with Israel.

Some Egyptians get upset when they find out that Americans equate Egypt with the pyramids and the pharaohs, but for whatever reason, Egypt holds a special place in the American imagination.

MJT: What do Egyptians say when you tell them about the Gallup poll?

Eric Trager: I mention it all the time. And it’s not just that 58 percent of Americans liked Egypt in 2010. In 2011, something like 88 percent supported the uprising against Hosni Mubarak. That’s incredible.

MJT: And what the Egyptians say about that?

Eric Trager: One on one, it touches them. So I think it needs to be part of our public diplomacy. We have interests there. The United States Embassy in Egypt is one of the largest in the world. But Americans also like Egypt. They like visiting Egypt and seeing the pyramids and going to Luxor. And they like being with an ally.

MJT: Is Egypt really an ally at this point?

Eric Trager: Among Egyptians there is strong hostility toward the United States and American foreign policy. Conspiracy theories are rampant, especially about 9/11. Dealing with that will always be a significant challenge. 

At the same time, Egypt has been basically cooperative with American strategic interests for nearly forty years. We have significant disagreements about Egyptian domestic politics, and it’s a tumultuous place, but unless hostile Islamists emerge yet again—which is certainly possible—Egypt will remain in the American camp.

And there’s the odd fact that Americans really like Egypt.

MJT: That is odd. It seems even more odd to me now that I’ve actually been there several times.

Eric Trager: I was shocked when I saw these polls.

MJT: Me too, but I suppose I’m only a little bit shocked. I used to think about Egypt in exactly the way you described—that it’s a great ancient Mediterranean civilization. My perception of the place is very different now, but my original impression was precisely the one you described.

Eric Trager: Of course Egypt’s popularity has declined in America since 2010. It’s tumultuous, full of radicals, and has an aggressive military. Its popularity is not what it was a few years ago.

Releasing Palestinian Murderers to Restart Peace Talks

Who is Abu-Musa Salam Ali Atia? The man who murdered a Holocaust survivor in 1994 with a series of axe blows to the neck.  Abu Musa’s Israeli victim was 67 at the time, a plasterer by trade, working on a construction site.

Who is Ra’ai Ibrahim Salam Ali? Well, like Abu Musa he was a Fatah member, and like him too, he had a penchant for murdering old Israelis with an axe: In this case, a 79-year-old. The victim, Moris Eisenstatt, was reading a book on a public bench when the blows struck.

Who is—or rather who was—Israel Tenenbaum? He was a night watchman at a hotel, a 72-year-old grandfather when he was beaten to death by a steel rod. The steel rod was wielded by yet another Fatah member, Salah Ibrahim Ahmad Mugdad. That was in 1993.

A Local Election in Yaroslavl, Russia's Opposition Capital

While most of the attention in the run-up to Russia’s September 8th regional elections has understandably been focused on the election for Moscow mayor, where protest leader Alexei Navalny is challenging the Kremlin-backed incumbent, Sergei Sobyanin, there are other campaigns of considerable interest—and considerable potential for new troubles for the regime.

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